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BOOK REVIEW
CHOOSING EQUALITY: SCHOOL CHOICE, THE CONSTITUTION, AND
CIVIL SOCIETY. By Joseph P. Viteritti. Washington, D.C.:
Brookings Institution Press. 1999. Pp. x, 284. $29.95
Reviewed by Brian P. Marron*
I. INTRODUCTION
In the groundbreaking case of Brown v. Board of Education,'
the Court recognized the importance of education in the lives of all
Americans:
Today it is a principal instrument in awakening the
child to cultural values, in preparing him for later
professional training, and in helping him to adjust
normally to his environment. In these days, it is
doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to
succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an
education. Such an opportunity, where the state has
undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made
available to all on equal terms.
2
Since the time of the Brown decision in the 1950s, education has
become an even more essential vehicle for economic and social
mobility.
3
Unfortunately Brown's vision of equal educational opportunity
has not been realized.4 Although explicit racial segregation by law
* J.D. Candidate, University of Maryland School of Law, 2002; B.A., University of
Maryland, College Park, 1998.
1. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2. Id. at 493.
3. DAVID L. KIRP, JUST SCHOOLS: THE IDEA OF RACIAL EQUALITY IN AMERICAN
EDUCATION 6 (1982).
4. Brown, 347 U.S. at 492 "Here unlike Sweatt v. Painter, there are findings that the
Negro and white schools involved have been equalized, or are being equalized, with respect to
buildings, curricula, qualifications and salaries of teachers, and other 'tangible' factors. Our
decision, therefore, cannot turn merely on a comparison of these tangible factors." Id. This
implies that equality in the "tangible" factors is a necessary component of a system of equal
educational equality along with, as the Court found in Brown, the absence of stigmatization
caused by de jure racial segregation.
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has been eliminated, children from lower socioeconomic backgrounds
remain trapped in insufficient schools. Racial minorities and the poor
attend substandard urban public schools at disproportionate rates.
While only twenty-four percent of all American students attend urban
schools, thirty-five percent of the poor and forty-three percent of racial
minorities attend urban schools.5 Numerous measures of school
performance illustrate the inadequacy of urban schools. A recent
study found that only forty percent of fourth- and eighth-grade
students attending city schools met minimum basic standards on
national exams in reading math and science. 6 In contrast, the same
study found that nearly two-thirds of students in suburban and rural
districts met these standards.
7
Predictably, a clear disparity is also found when the
performance of various races is compared. Despite significant
progress since the 1970s, the average African American still scores
below seventy-five percent of whites on almost every standardized
test. Because education is so vital to upward mobility, a
disproportionate number of non-Asian minorities receive unequal
education dooming them to life in the underclass.
9
Recent political policy debates involve the topic of education
reform. As a result much has been written over the struggle to create
effective schools for all. In Choosing Equality: School Choice, the
Constitution, and Civil Society, first published in 1999, Joseph P.
Viteritti examines the movement to reform schools and describes the
advantages of a reconstructed educational system based on giving
power to the parents to choose to send their children to a better
school. 10
Viteritti claims that the best way to improve educational
opportunity for underserved populations is by making schools compete
for students (and funding) by giving families in need their share of the
state's education funds to send their children to the school of their
choice."1 This would give lower-income families some control over
5. JOSEPH P. VITERITrI, CHOOSING EQUALITY: SCHOOL CHOICE, THE CONSTITUTION AND
CIVIL SOCIETY 7 (Advanced Copy 1999).
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Christopher Jencks and Meredith Phillips, The Black-White Test Score Gap, in THE
AFRICAN AMERICAN PREDICAMENT 63 (Christopher H. Foreman, Jr. ed., 1999).
9. KmP, supra note 3 at 31 (explaining the link between education and mobility).
10. VITERITTI, supra note 5.
11. Id. at 14.
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the quality of education received by their children, a privilege taken
for granted by wealthier families. A choice system also requires
schools to deliver quality educations or to close due to declining
enrollments. Viteritti notes that a choice system would be supported
by a wide range of options for parents, including private, parochial,
charter, and schools set up by entrepreneurs.
12
The book opens with a discussion of the ongoing debate over
choice as an option for school reform.' 3 Viteritti then turns to other
methods of educational reform that have been proposed and
implemented over the years. 14 Then he presents an examination of
reform efforts that have involved the concept of choice. 15  The
discussion shifts to highlighting the effectiveness of non-public
schools and voucher programs in improving educational outcomes for
minorities and the poor. 6 The following chapters examine the legal
problems associated with including religious schools among the
options of a broad-ranging school choice system. 17 Viteritti finishes
the book with a discussion of education in promoting civic
involvement and provides some general principles for legislatures in
constructing school reform based on choice.'
8
Viteritti's examination of education reform in this book breaks
down into three parts: 1) an analysis of previous reform efforts, 2) a
presentation of the problem concerning the separation of church and
state, and 3) an outline of what he believes is an effective system of
education based on parental choice that will alleviate the inequities
faced by minorities and the poor. Each part is summarized below
followed by a critique of Viteritti's entire argument.
If one were to construct a society and school system from
scratch, Viteritt's proposed plan would be effective and just. The plan,
however, underestimates the effects the current system has on the
children currently conscribed to inadequate schools. Finally, while
Viteritti notes the strong political opposition to change, he fails to
adequately discuss a method of overcoming these barriers.
12. Id. at 4.
13. Id. at 1-22.
14. Id. at 23-52.
15. Id. at 53-79.
16. Id. at 80-116.
17. Id. at 117-79.
18. Id. at 180-224.
20011
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II. EDUCATION REFORM EFFORTS
Viteritti opens the discussion of various reform efforts by
presenting the ideas of economist Milton Friedman. 19 Friedman
believed that the key to improving education is the free market theory.
He proposed replacing public schools with privately-operated schools
funded by a system of vouchers given to every child.20  Friedman
noted that the public school system was a government-run monopoly
that only allowed freedom of choice to those few families able to
afford private schools. 21 Friedman's plan called for the government to
set minimum standards of operations for education providers. The
institutions would only survive if they were able to attract enough
"customers" to bring their government-issued vouchers. 22
Viteritti continues his account of the development of the choice
innovation noting that more than a decade after Friedman, the dean of
the Harvard Graduate School of Education, Theodore Sizer, offered a
modified version of Friedman's voucher plan.23 Sizer, concerned with
liberal causes, included a voucher plan targeted at poor families within
his proposal for a "poor children's bill of rights." 24 He noted that a
universal plan would perpetuate inequality as the middle class would
evacuate the public schools, leaving the poor behind.25
Viteritti then explains that two years after Sizer, sociologist
Christopher Jencks created a highly regulated choice plan.26 Jencks's
plan required that choice schools accept all applicants and fill their
seats through a lottery system.27 Most importantly, the plan required
that the school accept the government-issued voucher as full payment
of tuition.28  Following the Jencks proposal, educational groups,
including teachers unions, mobilized and lobbied Congress in
opposition to any voucher plan.
In 1971, legal scholars John Coons and Stephen Sugarman
approached the reform issue by examining the disparities in funding
19. Id. at 53.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 54.
23. Id. at 55.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id
28. Id. The plan was only tested on a limited basis and in only one city.
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between richer and poorer school districts.29 They proposed a plan to
overcome the disparities by distributing funds directly to parents.
30
Coons and Sugarman's plan attempted to infuse poor families with the
empowerment enjoyed by middle-class families who are free to choose
the schools that "reflected their own educational values."'" Viteritti
notes that while the concept of choice began to be popular among free
market economists, liberals, and cultural and religious minorities, it
had yet to catch on with the general public; ballot initiatives were
defeated in Michigan in 1978 and Washington, D.C., in 1981.32
Viteritti then proceeds to describe the development and
implementation of some public school choice plans beyond the
voucher concept. Viteritti begins with a discussion of the creation of
magnet schools to further desegregation efforts in the late 1970s.
33
Magnet schools are specialized public schools designed with "enriched
academic programs" to attract a diverse racial mix of students.
34
Viteritti points out that mostly whites and more advantaged minorities
attend magnet schools resulting in the displacement of the more
talented students from the nearby schools. 35 Also, minority students
are often denied admittance to magnet schools in order for the school
to maintain the intended racial balance.
3 6
Viteritti next discusses public school reform programs
designed to allow for some parental choice while simultaneously
protecting the desegregation goal.37 Under a controlled choice
program, if certain standards of racial balance are not met, the
administration will assign students to a particular school regardless of
their wishes.38 The Cambridge, Massachusetts, school system was the
first district to adopt a controlled choice plan. 39 Cambridge removed
assignment zones, allowed families to rank their preferences for which
school they wanted their children to attend, and retained the possibility
29. Id. at 56.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 56-57.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 58.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
2001]
[VOL. 1:115
of mandatory assignments for schools lacking racial balance.4 °
Although controlled choice plans resulted in positive effects on
integration and academic performance, some programs had problems
with the large increase in transportation costs and parents' general
preference for neighborhood schools.41
Viteritti describes the choice-based reform plan of the schools
in East Harlem in the 1970s.42  East Harlem's plan consisted of
creating alternative schools by erasing assignment zones, allowing
schools to specialize around curricular themes, and giving the
individual schools almost complete autonomy that allowed schools to
innovate. 43  A 1998 study of the system found that student
performance improved significantly during the 1980s. 44  Viteritti
mentions that the Harlem plan became more partisan as the idea of
alternative schools became associated with an argument for choice, a
topic identified with conservative politics.
45
Viteritti next mentions the idea of allowing parents to choose to
send their children to schools in different districts. 6 First adopted by
Minnesota in 1985, interdistrict choice allowed at risk students in need
of remedial instruction to cross district lines and attend any school
with available space.47 By 1992 there were 8,500 students exercising
this Option. 48 Since 1987, seventeen states have implemented similar
plans.4 9 In 1992, the Carnegie Foundation issued a report examining
the increasing school choice trend.50 The Carnegie report argued that
interdistrict choice plans funneled money from poorer districts into
more advantaged districts with a higher number of desirable schools.
51
Viteritti rejects this argument by illustrating "that while state funds
40. Id.
41. Id. at 59. The Richmond, California, school district went bankrupt from the
increased cost of transportation and specialized programs."[M]ost parents seek to avoid
extensive travel unless there is an extraordinary academic benefit derived in the form of a
magnet or specialized program.. ." Id.
42. Id. at 60-62.
43. Id. at 60.
44. Id. at 61. The reading and math scores improved greatly in comparison to other
nearby school districts.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 62-64.
47. Id. at 62.
48. Id. at 63.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
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followed students to other locations, home districts were not expected
to contribute any support for those of their residents who were being
educated elsewhere . . . interdistrict choice made more per capita
dollars available for students who remained behind. 52
The next innovation in school choice discussed is the founding
of charter schools. Charter schools result when the state or local
governing body grants permission (through a charter) for a group to
create a new school (or convert an old one) that will run nearly
independent of the state. 53 Charter schools operate at the school level
where school personnel have wide discretion in budget, personnel, and
school policies.54 In exchange for this freedom, the charter school
faces a higher level of accountability as they must meet state-
established academic and financial standards as required by their
charter. 55 Charter schools that fail to meet these standards are shut
down. 56 As of 1999 there were about 1,200 charter schools operating
across the nation.
57
Viteritti notes that the concept of charter schools allows for
entrepreneurs to enter the education market. 58 He gives the example of
the Edison Project, a private entity begun by communications
executive Chris Whittle, which cooperates with local districts in the
management of schools. 59 Since 1995, Edison has invested $70
million in public education, but since it operates the Edison schools as
charter schools and receives public financing, the schools must accept
students on a first come, first served basis and remain accountable to
public authority. 60  Viteritti notes that despite the successes of the
Edison Project, it faces serious opposition from teachers unions at the
opening of most new schools.
6 1
Viteritti then describes the political controversy over charter
school legislation. 62  Supporters of charter schools faced opposition
52. Id.
53. Id. at 65. Charters are released from all regulations except those concerning civil
rights, health, and safety.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 67.
58. Id. at 68.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 69.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 69-72.
20011
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from local school boards unwilling to give up any power and teachers
unions fearing teachers would begin to negotiate contracts
independently with charter schools. 63 As the Clinton administration
began to warm to the idea of a modified charter school concept,64 the
battle over the charter school concept shifted from whether charter
school laws should be allowed to what restrictions should be placed on
charter schools. 65  Viteritti notes that the American Federation of
Teachers released a report complimenting the Rhode Island charter
system, which happens to be one of the most restrictive in the nation,
limiting charters to existing public schools, allowing conversion only
with approval of two-thirds of the teachers and half the parents, and
mandating that all teachers in charter schools remain employees of the
school district.66 Viteritti explains that such restrictive charter school
laws undermine the free-market effects of a system of choice based on
charter schools.
67
Viteritti stops to examine the effectiveness of charter schools in
improving student performance. He warns that determining the
effectiveness of charter schools remains difficult because they are by
nature very diverse. 69  Given this warning about generalizing the
results, Viteritti goes on to describe charter schools as typically much
smaller than public schools, with similar racial balance, and greater
levels of parental satisfaction. 70  He also notes that most states
authorize charter schools with laws that undermine their
effectiveness. 71  Often the approval of the local school board is
required for the granting of a charter and the charter schools receive
only a portion of the per-pupil operating costs as the local district
keeps the remainder.
72
The next chapter of Choosing Equality tracks how private and
parochial schools have produced higher educational quality than public
63. Id. at 70.
64. As a compromise between Democratic politicians and teachers unions, charter
schools are an acceptable choice reform as they involve no public funding for private schools,
avoid church-state entanglements, and potentially provide for greater accountability. Id. at 71.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 72.
68. Id. at 72-77.
69. Id. at 72.
70. Id. at 72-73.
71. Id. at 75.
72. Id.
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schools. 73  Viteritti argues that any effective choice plan should
include private and parochial schools in order to promote
competition-forcing public schools to improve or collapse-and to
give parents a broader range of choices.74
Viteritti then examines the school choice experiments in
Milwaukee and Cleveland." In Milwaukee, after a tough political
battle in the Wisconsin legislature, a weakened choice law passed in
1990.76 The number of scholarships was limited to one percent of the
city public school enrollment and were only available on a lottery
basis to families below a certain poverty level.77 Almost immediately
after the bill was signed into law, the plan was bombarded with legal
challenges resulting in a 1995 ruling preventing parents from using the
scholarships to send their children to religious schools.
78
Interpretation of the results of the choice effort in Milwaukee differed
along political lines.79 In 1998 the Wisconsin Supreme Court
overturned two lower court decisions and found that allowing parents
to use scholarships at private and parochial schools did not violate the
state or federal constitutions. 80  The United States Supreme Court
declined to hear the appeal of this ruling, and the following fall
approximately 6,200 students attended the private school of their
choice.8'
The Cleveland plan granted scholarships on a lottery basis
favoring low-income families. 82 The amount given varied by family
income and initially students could use the funds at any school within
the city. 83  Again, lawsuits followed the passage of the law and
eventually an appellate court found the use of the funds at religious
schools unconstitutional.84 The studies of the effects of the choice
73. Viteritti illustrates this point by describing the success of Catholic schools in detail.
Id. at 82-86.
74. Id. at 114.
75. Id. at98-113.
76. Id. at 101.
77. Id.
78. Thomas v. Jackson, 536 N.W. 3d 140, 142 (Wis. 1996).
79. VITERiTrI, supra note 5, at 102-107.
80. Jackson v. Benson, 578 N.W. 2d 602, 632 (Wis. 1998).
81. Jackson v. Benson, 525 U.S. 997 (1998) (writ of certiorari denied).
82. VITERiTrI, supra note 5, at 110.
83. Id.
84. Simmons-Harris v. Goff, No. 96APE08-982, No. 96APEO8-991, 1997 Ohio App.,
LEXIS 1766, at 27 (Ohio App. 10d May 1, 1997). The Simmons court stated: "Because the
scholarship program provides direct and substantial, non-neutral government aid to sectarian
2001]
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plan on student performance varied with the sponsorship of the
research.85 One study reported improvement and parental satisfaction
while another found no improvement.
86
The battle over implementation of the school choice plans in
Milwaukee and Cleveland shows the importance of the issue of
whether extending parental choice to religious schools violates the
concept of separation of church and state prescribed in the federal and
state constitutions. Viteritti devotes the next section of the book to
discussing the inappropriateness of such a strict separationist policy.
III. SCHOOL CHOICE AND THE SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE
In order for the school choice philosophy to be successful in
promoting competition and raising the quality of education provided,
the system must offer a sufficient number of options for parents. A
large number of private schools are run by religious institutions. This
fact raises significant First Amendment issues when parents seek to
use government-granted education funds at parochial schools. The
First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that:
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion,
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof., 87  Viteritti argues that the
First Amendment was not intended to preclude any government aid
that even indirectly benefits religious institutions and that such
restriction is a violation of parents' free exercise rights.88 He supports
his argument by outlining the history of the concept of separation of
church and state. 
89
Viteritti first explains how the founders did not fear all
connection between government and religion. 90 He cites Madison's
belief that a pluralistic political culture including many groups protects
schools we hold that it has the primary effect of advancing religion in violation of the
Establishment Clause."
85. VITERrTI, supra note 5, at 111-12.
86. Id. One study finding positive results was conducted by choice advocate Professor
Paul Peterson of Harvard. Professor Kim Metcalf of Indiana University conducted a study
commissioned by the Ohio Department of Education. VIERITTI, supra note 5, at 112.
87. U.S. CONST. amend. 1.
88. VrrEwTI, supra note 5, at 117-18.
89. Id. at 118-129.
90. Id. "By the time the framers sat down to draft the Bill of Rights, a clear pattern of
religious toleration had begun to appear." Id. at 128.
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against tyranny of the majority. 91 Viteritti notes that given Madison's
vision of plurality and equality, nonreligion should not be given
priority over religion.
92
Viteritti then examines the interpretation of the Establishment
Clause and the Free Exercise Clause by the Supreme Court.93 The
recognition of a strict separation between church and state in the
context of aid to schools flows from the 1947 decision in Everson v.
Board of Education.94 In Everson, the Court upheld a New Jersey
statute that provided reimbursement of transportation costs to parents
of children that attended parochial schools.95 In doing so the decision
noted the existence of a delicate balance necessary in deciding state
aid to religious institutions and individuals:
New Jersey cannot consistently with the "establishment
of religion" clause of the First Amendment contribute
tax-raised funds to the support of an institution which
teaches the tenets and faith of any church. On the other
hand, other language of the amendment commands that
New Jersey cannot hamper its citizens in the free
exercise of their own religion. Consequently, it cannot
exclude individual Catholics, Lutherans,
Mohammedans, Baptists, Jews, Methodists, Non-
believers, Presbyterians, or the members of any other
faith, because of their faith, or lack of it, from receiving
the benefits of public welfare legislation.
96
In striking this balance in Everson, the Court recognized that people of
faith cannot be denied welfare services that are granted to the public at
large.97 The Court noted that the Free Exercise clause protects parents
who send their children to schools reflecting their particular religion
and, thus, cannot be denied the aid and services granted to others.
98
91. Id. at 121-126.
92. Id. at 126.
93. Id. at 129-44.
94. 330 U.S. I (1947).
95. Id.
96. Id. at 16.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 17. The Court noted that "[m]easured by these standards, we cannot say that
the First Amendment prohibits New Jersey from spending taxraised funds to pay the bus fares
2001]
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Viteritti notes that, unfortunately, subsequent courts have
shifted the balance toward including any aid to religious schools as
restricted by the First Amendment's Establishment Clause. In
Abington School District v. Schempp,99 the Court outlined a new
stricter standard of what government action violates the Establishment
Clause:
[The Court] has consistently held that the clause
withdrew all legislative power respecting religious
belief or the expression thereof. The test may be stated
as follows: what are the purpose and the primary effect
of the enactment? If either is the advancement or
inhibition of religion then the enactment exceeds the
scope of legislative power as circumscribed by the
Constitution. That is to say that to withstand the
strictures of the Establishment Clause there must be a
secular legislative purpose and a primary effect that
neither advances nor inhibits religion.'
00
Eight years later, the Court in Lemon v. Kurzman adopted the
"purpose and effect" reasoning and expanded it into a restrictive and
imprecise test.10 1  The "Lemon test" states that government action
violates the Establishment clause when it 1) has no "secular purpose,"
2) has a "primary effect" of advancing religion, and 3) fosters
"excessive entanglement" between church and state.'0 2 This strict
separationist standard would soon inhibit state aid to students
attending parochial schools. 1
03
Viteritti notes that in 1973 in Committee for Public Education
and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist,1°4 the Court struck down a New York
statute that, inter alia, granted tax relief to help parents who sent their
of parochial school pupils as a part of a general program under which it pays the fares of
pupils attending public and other schools." Everson, 330 U.S. at 17.
99. Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
100. Id. at 222.
101. VITERITTI, supra note 5, at 135 (citing Lemon v. Kurzman, 430 U.S. 602 (1971)).
102. Lemon v. Kurzman, 430 U.S. 602, 643 (1971) (Brennan, J., concurring).
103. VITERITTI, supra note 5, at 136.
104. Committee for Public Education and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756
(1973).
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children to parochial school.' 0 5  It found that even such indirect aid
programs "cannot be squared with the principle of neutrality" and run
counter to the Establishment Clause. 106 The Burger Court continued to
perceive religious interests as suspicious and construed the
Establishment Clause strictly denying choice to many who wished to
benefit from public assistance for educational needs.
0 7
In the past eighteen years the Court has relaxed the standard
somewhat and keeps alive the hope that a program may be established
to allow impoverished students to choose to attend parochial schools
with state assistance.'O' In Meuller v. Allen,'0 9 the Court drew a
distinction between direct and indirect aid to religious institutions."
l0
In Meuller, a Minnesota statute granted a tax deduction to parents of
public and non-public school students to help pay for books, tuition,
and transportation."' The Court found that the Minnesota statute met
the three prongs of the Nyquist test even though the funds indirectly
went to religious schools.112
It is true, of course, that financial assistance provided to
parents ultimately has an economic effect comparable
to that of aid given directly to the schools attended by
their children. It is also true, however, that under
Minnesota's arrangement public funds become
available only as a result of numerous, private choices
of individual parents of school-age children." 
3
105. Id. at 793. The Court found that "[lInsofar as such benefits render assistance to
parents who send their children to sectarian schools, their purpose and inevitable affect are to
aid and advance those religious institutions." Id.
106. Id.
107. See Leutkemeyer v.Kaufman, 419 U.S. 888 (1974); Wolman v. Waiters, 443 U.S. 229
(1977); Franchise Tax Board v. United Americans for Public Schools, 419 U.S. 890 (1974);
Byrne v. Public Funds For Public Schools, 442 U.S. 907 (1980).
108. ViTEuRTTI, supra note 5, at 138-43.
109. Id. at 395.
110. Meuller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
111. Id. at391.
112. Id at 395. In finding the secular purpose of the Minnesota statute the Court stated:
"A state's decision to defray the cost of educational expenses incurred by parents-regardless
of the type of schools their children attend--evidences a purpose that is both secular and
understandable. An educated populace is essential to the political and economic health of any
community, and a state's efforts to assist parents in meeting the rising cost of educational
expenses plainly serves this secular purpose of ensuring that the state's citizenry is well-
educated." Id.
113. Id. at399.
2001]
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This is a significant change from the 1973 holding of Sloan v. Lemon
where any sign of an indirect benefit received by a religious institution
violated the Establishment Clause.1
14
In Witters v. Washington Department of Services for the Blind,
a student used a public scholarship to attend a Bible college. 115 The
Court held that since the aid was offered to all students, the fact that
some individuals choose to exercise their faith and attend parochial
schools did not cause the program to run afoul of the Establishment
Clause. 11
6
Viteritti continues his discussion of the legal barriers facing
choice plans, including parochial schools, with a presentation of the
treatment of the issue by state law." 7 In contrast to the federal courts'
tolerance of school choice programs that include the religious school
option, many state constitutions contain provisions for explicitly strict
separation. 118 The so-called Blaine Amendments, adopted in the mid-
nineteenth century, bowed to anti-Catholic fervor by forming a
requirement for new states' admission to the union.' 9 Thirteen states
still have constitutional provisions restricting public funds solely for
public school use.' 20 As a result, school choice opponents often seek
to litigate in state courts using state constitutional arguments.' 2'
Viteritti argues that the exclusion of parochial schools from
school choice programs causes unique difficulties for minority and
urban communities. Given the important role that churches play in the
black community, the effects of a strict separationist policy are
multiplied. 122 Many black leaders emerge from the local clergy and
114. VrrcnTTI, supra note 5, at 137 (citing Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825, 834 (1973)).
115. 474 U.S. 481 (1986).
116. Id. at 488. The Court noted that "[als far as the record shows, vocational assistance
provided under the Washington program is paid directly to the student, who transmits it to the
educational institution of his or her choice. Any aid provided under Washington's program
that ultimately flows to religious institutions does so only as a result of the genuinely
independent and private choices of aid recipients." Id.
117. VITERIari, supra note 5, at 168-77.
118. Idat 17.
119. Id. at 152-53. Blaine's amendment sought to undermine "the viability of schools run
by religious minorities." Id. at 153.
120. Id. at 169.
121. Id. at 168.
122. Id. at 20. Viteritti explains that the "[s]eparation of church and state is a white
middle class legal and social construct that is out of step with the ethos of the black
community and undermines the black community's most significant local institution." Id.
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are subsequently denied permission to start charter schools. 123 The
few clergy members who have been granted permission to open
charter schools have shown separationists' fears to be unfounded as
there is no evidence that they have used their schools to promote
religion.
124
Impoverished members of religious minority groups are also
denied equal educational opportunity by a school choice program
excluding parochial schools. 25  While middle-class parents make
value-based choices for which school their child will attend, less
affluent families may be trapped in a public school that promotes ideas
contrary to their religious beliefs. 26 In that way, Viteritti explains, it
is easy to see how the denial of Free Exercise argument is valid.
Viteritti ends his discussion of the barriers against including
religious schools in a choice plan on a pessimistic note. He explains
that no state is under any constitutional requirement to provide public
funding for choice outside of the public schools and therefore
expanding the range of options to include parochial schools remains a
matter of politics.
IV. VITERITTI'S PROPOSED SCHOOL REFORM POLICY
Viteritti concludes his book by listing some principles for
policymakers to use to build an effective policy of equal education
through school choice. 128
Market Principles in School Choice: Viteritti explains the
diverse demand in school choice programs as some parents exercise
choice to escape poor quality schools while others seek a school with a
particular philosophy, theme, or instructional approach.' 29 Many want
a school that reflects their religious beliefs. 3° A limited demand also
exists for participation in school choice programs as most families are
123. See id. at 206.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 120.
126. Id. Viteritti gives an example of how some sexual education lessons in public
school conflict with the beliefs of Roman Catholics. Id. at 120-26.
127. Id. at 179.
128. Id. at 213-24.
129. Id. at213.
130. Id.
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satisfied with their schools (they have already exercised choice). 131
Presently there is an inadequate supply of schools to support a broad,
effective school choice system.132 Due to limited classroom space and
already long waiting lists, a choice plan should foster the creation of
many new charter schools.133 Viteritti claims that demand created by a
choice program will induce a greater supply of school options. 34
Giving parents free choice will provide incentives for private schools
to expand enrollments and induce entrepreneurs to open new
schools-a claim based on sound economic reasoning concerning
normal market functions. 13
5
Competition spurred by the availability of many options for
education will improve the public schools. 136 To support this assertion
Viteritti gives the example of Giffen Elementary School in Albany,
New York. 137 At Giffen, philanthropist Virginia Gilder offered to pay
ninety percent of the private school tuition costs of any student who
wanted to leave a failing school.13 8 In response to this offer twenty
percent of the students accepted the subsidy and the school system
replaced a principal, two administrators, and twelve teachers. The
newly invigorated staff immediately began a range of innovations. 139
Viteritti argues that in situations like Giffen, competition will motivate
professionals to do a better job. 140 Viteritti notes that in jurisdictions
with experimental choice plans, policymakers have limited the number
of choices available. 141
Advantages of Private Schools: Private and parochial schools
minimize the impact of a student's socioeconomic background on his
or her academic performance and display an inherent sense of
community. 142 Private schools function as voluntary associations of
professionals, parents, and children in a caring supportive community,
while public schools have operated as massive bureaucracies based on
131. Id. at214.
132. Id. at 214-15. A waiting list exists for both charter schools and select public schools.
Idat 215.
133. Id. at 215.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. at215-16.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 215-16.
140. Id. at216.
141. Id.
142. Id.
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principles of hierarchy, order, predictability, control, and
uniformity.
143
Eligibility for School Choice Program: Education policy must
be designed to benefit the most disadvantaged members of society.
144
Putting educational resources in the hands of parents provides
economic and political empowerment for disadvantaged
communities. 145 Poor families should be given the widest range of
options including public, private, and religious schools. 146 Charter and
public schools should be available on first come, first served basis, but
where demand exceeds supply, priority should be given to students
who attend failing schools, then excess demand should be met through
a lottery. 14 7 Participation in the private school choice program should
be limited to families with economic need. 148 Children opting out of
regular public schools for academic reasons should be given priority
over those opting out for religious or philosophical reasons. 1
49
Charter Schools: A choice law should promote the quantity
and diversity of charter schools. 150 Charter schools should be given
the maximum degree of autonomy.'51 Charter schools, in exchange for
autonomy, should meet high academic standards set by the states.
152
In measuring standards, states should initially factor in the fact that
children's earlier education occurred at failing schools.153 There
should be no cap on the number of charter schools and they should
receive equal funding as traditional public schools.'
54
Admission to Nonpublic Schools: Schools that participate in
the choice program must accept all students without regard to race,
ethnicity, or religion. 155 Single-sex schools may remain the same.
156
Private schools must accept the voucher as full payment for tuition.
157
143. Id. at 217.
144. Id. at 219.
145. Id. at 224.
146. Id. at 219.
147. VITERITrI, supra note 5, at 219.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 219-20.
150. Id. at220.
151. Id.
152. Vimmr'ri, supra note 5, at 220.
153. Id. at221.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 222.
157. Id.
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Families should not be required to contribute additional money as
requirement for admission or retention.'
58
Religion in Schools: Religion can be mentioned but not
promoted in public schools. 159 "Any organized activity that appears to
promote religious beliefs must be deemed impermissible."' 16  School
choice plans that include parochial schools as options should reduce
pressure to include prayer in public schools. 16 1 A state ban on funds to
parents who wish to send children to parochial school creates serious
issues under the federal Free Exercise clause. 162 In parochial schools,
families should be given the option to opt out of religious instruction
and exercises. 163
V. ANALYSIS OF VITERITTI'S APPROACH TO SCHOOL REFORM
Viteritti's ambitious plan of school reform, based on a system
of school choice, relies on basic market forces. His plan fails to take
into account two important factors which may likely result in the
demise of his proposal. The first factor assumes a cooperative, benign
laissez-faire government. This pre-condition is unlikely to occur as
strong political forces have aligned against choice plans for the
preservation of the status quo.
The second factor is that, assuming a choice system can be
implemented, its effectiveness will be undermined by the first
generation of students taking advantage of choice. Since first
generation students come from failing schools, their performance will
improve at levels lower than expected. This will give further
ammunition to choice opponents fighting against such reforms.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 218. For additional analysis of these barriers as well as a construction of
school choice that may overcome them, see Brian P. Marron, The Final Reform: A Centrist
Vision of School Choice, 8 GEO. J. POVERTY L. & POL'Y (forthcoming June 2001).
163. Id. at 222.
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A. Viteritti Underestimates the Support for the Status Quo
While there may be hope for reform efforts to overcome the
barriers placed by the courts, adequate reform measures also face
daunting obstacles from the political process and the institution of
education itself.164 In order to be implemented, a broad, effective
school choice system must pass through the legislature, facing all of
the impediments of any other piece of legislation. Supporters of most
legislation must mobilize their political muscle to the fullest to force
their proposal through a body of representatives with varying political
goals, often beyond the proposed measure itself
The first major political obstacle faced in pushing for Viteritti's
proposed school choice system is the section of the populace it targets
has limited influence on the political process. People living in poverty
traditionally are unable to generate a large effective political
movement. 65 For years studies have shown the link between the level
of political activism and social variables such as education and
class. 166  Such socioeconomic research essentially illustrates that
"personal resources determine who participates in politics and how
well they do."' 167 Therefore, impoverished urban minorities have little
political muscle to push for changes in education. This political
disadvantage is compounded when one considers that the more
politically potent white middle-class suburbanites tend to believe that
their schools are satisfactory and may be less sensitive to the
discontent of urban parents. 168 As these dissatisfied parents call out to
their legislators for reform it is easy to see how the relatively weak
voices of the poor urban residents get drowned out by a cacophony of
a broad coalition of large well-financed interests opposing structural
education reform.
164. VITERITTI, supra note 5, at 38-39.
165. Denise C. Morgan, The Less Polite Questions: Race, Place, Poverty and Public
Education, in FINANCING OUR FUTURE: EDUCATION IMPROVEMENTS FOR THE 21ST CENTURY,
1998 ANN. SuRv. AM. L. 267, 281 (1998) Morgan notes that "[pleople in these communities
of concentrated poverty are not well positioned to bring about change. [They] lack mid-class
and working class families necessary to spearhead political activism or maintain institutions
that provide quality services." Id.
166. VirERrITT, supra note 5, at 45.
167. Id. at 188.
168. Id. at 214. Opponents of choice have caught on to this fact. They are able to
mobilize opposition to change by scaring the suburbanites with claims that reform proposals
will take away funds from more affluent schools to funnel them to underperforming schools.
20011
[VOL. 1:115
The perpetual American partisan battle for power assists in
impeding school reform efforts.' 69  The Democratic Party, currently
regarded as the party strongly favored by minorities and the poor,
opposes most choice-centered school reforms, while the Republicans,
the party of big business and "small government," generally support
choice-based school reforms. 170  This further complicates reform
efforts as the typically strong Democratically-loyal minority
community's partisan leanings make them skeptical of any reform plan
offered by members of the Republican Party. 171  At the same time,
members of the Democratic Party reject out of hand a reform plan that
may be beneficial to urban minorities to a significant part because it is
a plan offered by the opposition. Former Berkley law professor John
E. Coons, a Democrat, remarked:
Here is an educational system which prides itself on
being "public" but which provides access to the best
schools only for the rich, meanwhile herding the
workers and the poor into the state schools that operate
in those neighborhoods where they can afford to live...
[where] were the Marxist theorists whose vocation it is
(or at least was) to expose such nasty instruments of
class warfare? For that matter, where were-and where
are-those Democratic politicians who so constantly
assure us of their deep concern for the not-so-rich? So
169. A recent example of partisan politics infecting the school choice debate occurred
during the 2000 election over Michigan's Proposition I concerning a voucher system.
Republican governor Jim Engler voiced strong opposition to the proposal primarily because
supporting it would draw Democratic voters to the polls and thus harm other Republican
candidates on the ballot. Tom Bray, Debacle at the Voucher Frontiers, WASH. TIMES,
November 10, 2000, at A2 1.
170. Gary Rosen, Are School Vouchers Un-American?, COMMENTARY, February 1, 2000,
at 26. Rosen explains that "[w]hile leading Republicans and conservatives speak out for the
educational interests of the urban poor, liberal and Democratic standard-bearers continue to
stonewall for a status quo that even they must admit is unacceptable-a stance no less
embarrassing to the traditions of the Democratic party than to the democratic traditions of the
country." Id.
171. This skepticism may also be due to the fact that school choice originally developed
in the South as a white response to integration orders. Years later it again became popular in
the 1980s among political conservatives who sought to "advance the cultural and political
homogeneity of particular communities." Bruce Fuller and Richard F. Elmore, Policy Making
in the Dark: Illuminating the School Choice Debate, in WHO CHOOSES? WHO LOSES?:
CULTURE, INSTITUTIONS, AND THE UNEQUAL EFFECTS OF SCHOOL CHOICE 1, 3 (Bruce Fuller
and Richard F. Elmore eds., 1996).
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far as I can tell, the Democrats (my own party) are
either running these state schools that warehouse the
poor or-with the help of the teachers' unions-are
busy in the legislatures and Congress making sure that
nothing in this system changes except its ever-
expanding cost. The rich choose; the poor get
conscripted. 
72
Viewing the choice debate from an electoral politics perspective one
could also reasonably doubt the sincerity of some Republicans; their
support of school choice may simply be for the purpose of drawing
minority votes away from the Democrats without the intention of fully
implementing a broad, effective choice plan once elected. 73 Others
also point out that a powerful Republican constituency, the "Religious
Right," intending to increase attendance and funding at parochial
schools, strongly supports some school choice plans.174  In this
partisan tug-of-war politicians frame the school choice issue to their
best political advantage at the expense of blurring the truth about
various school choice plans. 175 As a result the misinformation infects
the general public who likely vote according to party preferences
rather than conduct independent analysis of the issue. 17  The effects
of this can be seen as various referenda concerning matters of school
choice have been placed on the ballot in many states. 177 The issue of
whether and how choice-based school reforms should be implemented
is being held captive as the two major parties struggle for power.
The adoption of Viteritti's school choice system faces an
enormous obstacle from the influence of powerful, well-funded
172. Peter Schrag, The Voucher Seduction: The Issue Liberals Can't Ignore, THE
AMERICAN PROSPECT, November 23, 1999, at 46.
173. Once in office their failure to implement choice can be easily blamed on Democratic
opposition.
174. Lynette Clemetson, A Ticket to Private School, NEWSWEEK, March 27, 2000, at 30.
175. Salim Muwakkil, School Choice: Do Vouchers Help or Harm Black Children?, IN
THESE TIMES, January 1 , 1998, at II.
176. Tom Bray, Debacle at the Voucher Frontiers, WASH. TIMES, November 10, 2000, at
A21. "Michigan's Proposal I was more narrowly drafted but fell victim to politics: The state's
influential Republican governor, John Engler, turned his back on the measure out of fear it
might lure hordes of Democrats to the polls and doom the re-election chances of his close
friend and ally, Sen. Spencer Abraham. " Id.
177. Thomas D. Elias, School Vouchers Set Back at Polls; Billionaire Backers Ready to
Try Again, WASH. TIMES, November 8, 2000, at A 16.
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interest groups. These groups are able to successfully lobby
legislatures and contribute large sums to the campaigns of legislators.
The most powerful and direct opponents of school reform are
the groups with a vested interest in the current educational system:
teachers' unions, school boards, superintendents, and administrators. 78
One would normally expect teachers' unions to favor efforts to
improve schools; however, the unions oppose choice reform efforts for
reasons other than education quality. The unions primarily seek to
protect the jobs of their members and to prevent the diversion of funds
from the public schools. When confronted with a hypothetical choice-
based reform plan that maintains and even increases the funding of
public schools, union opposition remains firm. In a recent interview
for Atlantic Monthly, reporter Matthew Miller proposed to Bob Chase,
President of the National Education Association-the nation's largest
teachers' union with over 2.2 million members179 -a choice plan that
the union representative should have found appealing:
Miller proposed an experiment in which funding for
education would be raised by 20 percent in several
cities; every student would receive a voucher for his
share of the newly enlarged budget, to be used as he
and his parents saw fit. By this means, students who
chose to remain in public schools would be guaranteed
generous financial support. Chase rejected the idea
outright-and did so again even when Miller suggested
doubling or even tripling the amount of money.
8 0
The teachers' unions continue to advance the interests of their
members often at the expense of the quality of education received by
their students. For example, in 1998 the NEA defeated a proposal by
178. VITERrrr1, supra note 5, at 87; James A. Peyser, School Choice: When not if 35
B.C. L. REv. 619, 622 (1994) Viteritti explains that "[tihe loudest critics of choice are the
teachers unions and school district administrators, who together with school committees and
university education departments comprise the core of the education establishment... [T]hey
have a vested interest in the status quo. Public school systems have a virtual monopoly on
elementary and secondary education in this country, and like all monopolists they want to
protect their franchise." ViTEuRTTi, supra note 5, at 87.
179. Christopher D. Pixley, The Next Frontier in Public School Finance Reform: A
Policy and Constitutional Analysis of School Choice Legislation, 24 J. LEGIS. 21, n.56 (1998).
180. Gary Rosen, Are School Vouchers Un-American?, CoMMENTARY, February, 1,
2000, at 26.
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the superintendent of the Dayton, Ohio, schools to turn over
management of five underperforming schools to the Edison Project, a
for-profit school management corporation. 18 The union articulated
fears that Edison would require teachers to work longer hours, extend
the school year, and promote contractual agreements between teachers
and schools outside of those negotiated by the union.' 82 The teachers'
unions, armed with budgets in the millions, present a formidable
obstacle that must be overcome to promote school choice programs. 183
Local political actors also assert a similar vested interest in
preventing broad, structural changes to the educational system.
Viteritti underestimates the complex problems presented by the
educational system at the local level. Superintendents, school boards,
and administrators are all subject to local political pressure. The
average term of a superintendent in large cities lasts less than three
years. 184  Since they are not typically in office long enough to
implement long-term changes, superintendents often reject any
structural changes in favor of short-term "fad" initiatives in order to
show some improvement to avoid being replaced. 185 This high
turnover rate makes it virtually impossible to rely on the leadership of
superintendents to implement structural reform. Even when a
superintendent's reform plan begins to show positive results, after the
superintendent leaves his or her reform programs are quickly
dismantled or superceded.1 86
School boards also contribute to the opposition of school
reform plans that include choice. In many inadequate urban school
districts, the boards have been vulnerable to capture by the educational
181. VITERITTI, supra note 5, at 69.
182. Id.
183. The National Education Association alone has an annual budget of $750 million and
annual political action fund of $22.5 million. Pixley, supra note 179, at 33 n.56.
184. FREDERICK M. HESS, SPINNING WHEELS: THE POLITICS OF URBAN SCHOOL REFORM
14 (1999).
185. Id. Small school-based programs have become the dominant and continuing
response. The constant implementation of "fad" initiatives may be adding to the problems
faced by failing schools. "A natural concomitant to the multiplicity of the programs, however,
is that they are often uncoordinated and may even be counterproductive in terms of student
learning. The addition of new programs on top of old ones may result in a disjointed and
fragmented set of experiences for students. . . . Much of school life seems to follow an
endless cycle of soliciting funds, implementing new initiatives, and then going out to solicit
more funds for even newer initiatives to replace current ones." JEFFREY R. HENIG ET AL., THE
COLOR OF SCHOOL REFORM: RACE POLITICS AND THE CHALLENGE OF URBAN EDUCATION 13
(1999).
186. PAUL T. HILL AND MARY BETH CELio, FIxING URBAN SCHOOLS 3 (1998).
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establishment. 187 Many school boards focus on "the employment and
career needs of administrators and employees" to the detriment of the
quality of education offered to the children of their district. 188 For
example, in districts where legislatures allowed the founding of charter
schools with the approval of the school board, the board gave charters
to few that applied.189 This maintains the current system by further
repressing formidable competition to the public schools.
Viteritti also overlooks the bureaucratic organization of public
school systems.' 90 The traditional bureaucratic structure in education,
like other bureaucracies, has a built in bias favoring the status quo that
works against any proposed structural changes such as school choice.
Daniel Levine explains this feature of bureaucracy:
Associated with the problems of institutional
complexity and overload are those of goal displacement
in the operation of large-scale rational bureaucracies.
Since bureaucratic organizations have been established
to impose a degree of order on an otherwise unplanned
and chaotic environment, there is a certain drive toward
permanency and self-perpetuation at the heart of
rational bureaucracy. When the goal of self-
perpetuation begins to outweigh other purposes, we
have one type of goal displacement. A second type
occurs then staff members become more concerned
with or adept at retaining their positions than with
furthering the organization's stated goals. 191
187. Aaron Saiger, Disestablishing Local School Districts as a Remedy for Educational
Inadequacy, 99 COLUM. L. REv. 1830, 1869 (1999) (citing WILBUR C. RICH, BLACK MAYORS
AND SCHOOL POLITICS 4-5 (1996)).
188. Id.
189. VITERITTI, supra note 5, at 70, 72, 75. Neal R. Pierce, Charter Schools - and Those
Who Resist Them, BALTIMORE SUN, November 6, 1996, at I IA. "In state after state, local
school boards and teacher unions are trying to quash charters. The reason: The spirited, upstart
charter schools-usually created by groups of teachers, parents or local colleges-are a threat
to established school bureaucracies and unions' exclusive bargaining rights." Id.
190. Daniel U. Levine, Concepts of Bureaucracy in Urban School Reform, in
TRANSFORMING URBAN EDUCATION 99 (Joseph Kretovics and Edward J. Nussel, eds. 1994).
191. Id. at 101.
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The bureaucratic educational system therefore seeks to protect itself
from change often at the expense of its main goal: to provide children
with a quality education.
Viteritti also disregards the importance of the schools as
employers in the urban community. In many cities the public school
system supplies most of the decent-paying jobs for African American
workers. 1  Recent studies of large cities show that the school system
has essentially become a job program under a system of political
patronage where the local government rewards campaign supporters
with administrative jobs in the public schools.' 93 For example, during
the 1970s and the 1980s in Baltimore, an alliance between black
professional educators, City Hall, and the school system developed.
Mayor Schaefer sought to solidify his support among black voters by
appointing his African American supporters as administrators,
principals, janitors, secretaries, teachers' aides, and other positions. 194
Evidence of rampant patronage was recently reported in the
Washington, D.C., public school system. The Washington Post
conducted a study of the family and personal relationships among
school employees finding "a host of connections," between principals,
assistant principals, administrators, and other employees. 195 It is no
192. James E. Ryan, Schools, Race, and Money, 109 YALE L.J. 249, 295 (1999) (citing
Amy Stuart Wells & Robert L. Crain, STEPPING OVER THE COLOR LINE: AFJiCAN-AMEICAN
STUDENTS IN WHITE SUBURBAN SCHOOLS 130 (1997). "For example, Williard H. Murray, an
African-American Democrat who represented Compton, California, for eight years until he
retired in 1996, believes that school boards in some poor minority communities have become
centers of patronage because they are one of the only large employers in town. As a result,
Murray suggests, 'the focus becomes political, not educational."' Id. at n.202.
193. Id. at 295; Saiger, supra note 187, at 1858-59, n.137. "District officials, dependent
on and close to the local electorate, but functioning with relatively little visibility or media
attention, thus face demands for employment, and sometimes for patronage and nepotism, that
can be at least as strong as demands for quality education. Temptations and opportunities for
corruption may also be greater at the district than at the state level." Id. at 1858-59; Peter
Applebome, Failure Calls Illinois City Home Turf, N.Y. TIMES, October 30, 1994, at A16
(noting that "contracts and jobs [are] apportioned to friends or relatives of school board
members" in East St. Louis, Illinois).
194. JEFFREY R. HENIG ET AL., THE COLOR OF SCHOOL REFORM: RACE POLITICS AND THE
CHALLENGE OF URBAN EDUCATION 123-24 (1999). Henig explains that "[ijncreasingly, the
school district resembled a patronage base. Personnel that orchestrated mayoral activities
were put on the school system's payroll.")(quoting Kenneth Wong, CITY CHOICES 11 5 (1990)).
195. Id. (citing Sari Horwitz and Valerie Strauss, A Well-Financed Failure: System
Protects Jobs While Shortchanging Classrooms, WASH. POST, February 16, 1997, at Al).
"[S]chool board member Angie Corley, who made $15,000 a year was joined on the [D.C.
Public Schools] payroll by her daughter, Gwenellen, a $49,096-a-year vice principal, and her
son, William, a $35,054-a-year science teacher." Id at 124.
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wonder that those interested in distributing the spoils of the election
protest the broad-ranging structural changes to the public school
system.
Various civil rights organizations also oppose school choice for
poor and minority students.1 6  Civil rights groups, including the
NAACP, the National Urban League, the Southern Christian
Leadership Conference, and the Rainbow/PUSH Coalition, criticize
school choice as draining money from the public schools, not holding
choice schools accountable, including schools that do not accept all
applicants, and leading to resegregation as white families take
advantage of the options. 197 Unfortunately, these civil rights groups
disagree with the very people they are fighting for as recent polls show
that poor urban parents support choice plans. 198
Another set of powerful interest groups that would strongly
oppose Viteritti's school choice plan are groups that oppose
government support for any form of religious education. Such groups
adopt a philosophy of strict separation of church and state under the
First Amendment. While Viteritti correctly points out that strict
separation is not necessarily what the drafters intended and the courts
may be more tolerant of indirect government aid to parochial schools,
he again underestimates the strength of these groups
Two notable groups opposing school choice efforts on a
separationist basis are the ACLU and People for the American Way.
People for the American Way, which, next to the teachers' unions, has
become the nation's leading opponent of vouchers, often claims that
choice schools violate voucher laws by discouraging some applicants
on the basis of their religion or by telling parents their children would
be required to participate in prayer and religion classes. 199
The ACLU has adopted the policy of opposing choice plans as
one of their most important issues. To further this goal, the ACLU
sponsors numerous lawsuits against school choice-based education
196. Muwakkil, supra note 175.
197. Id.
198. Rosen, supra note 170. "Unsurprisingly, given these results, interest in school
choice has risen greatly over the last few years among inner-city families. One survey found
that 85 percent of the urban poor now favor vouchers; another put support for the idea at 59
percent among blacks and 68 percent among Latinos. As if to prove these figures, when the
Children's Scholarship Fund, the largest of the private voucher programs, recently announced
its first national lottery for 40,000 scholarships, applications poured in from an astonishing
1.25 million children, all from low-income households." Id.
199. Schrag, supra note 172.
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legislation and is very active in the political debate against choice
programs. A regional director of the ACLU in Texas recently wrote in
The Dallas Morning News, "the American Civil Liberties Union of
Texas opposes any government voucher scheme that would fund
private schools with public money. There are well-organized and
well-funded groups that would like to see the end of public education.
Those organizations already have begun to sway public opinion. To
ensure they don't sway our public officials, we urge you to call or
write your state and federal representatives and urge them to vote
against voucher schemes."
200
Viteritti fails to adequately explain how his proposed school
choice program will overcome these formidable political barriers to
implementation.
B. Limited Initial Effects of a School Choice Program
Viteritti neglects to point out that enacting his proposed system
of school choice may not achieve its intended results for several years.
Many reformers fail to explain that the effectiveness of any reform
effort will be diminished significantly by the fact that the current
generation of students, especially those from lower socioeconomic
backgrounds which the plan may specifically be designed to help, have
unfortunately been under the auspices of an inadequate educational
system for years. The longer students stay in inadequate schools, the
less likely they are to succeed educationally. 20 1 Being educated under
an inadequate system pollutes a student's ability to accept and perform
under a "new" educational method. Patrick James McQuillan
illustrates this point in Educational Opportunity in an Urban American
High School, where he describes the reaction of students when
teacher's attempted a new educational method.20 2
McQuillan observed the efforts of three teachers in
implementing a United States history class that differed significantly
200. Diana Philip, School Voucher Plan Has Many Flaws, THE DALLAS MORNING NEWS,
January 25, 1999, at 13A.
201. HENIG ET AL., supra note 185, at 67 (noting the findings of the District of Columbia
Financial Responsibility and Management Assistance Authority's report on the failure of
D.C.'s public schools.).
202. PATRICK JAMES McQuiLLAN, EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY IN AN URBAN AMERICAN
HIGH SCHOOL 23-56 (1998). Id. at 23-58.
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203from the students' previous educational experience. He observed
that the students actively resisted the new program by drawing
collectively on their shared sense of "real school" and their definition
of reasonable teacher expectations. 204 McQuillan concluded that by
resisting changes the students "enacted their informal power so as to
implicate themselves in their own educational failure-in terms of the
grades they received, the skills they never developed, and how their
actions reinforced faculty perceptions of student indifference. '" 20 5
Such resistance by students moving into choice schools should
initially diminish the positive results of the school choice program
proposed by Viteritti. This will, in effect, provide heavy ammunition
to choice opponents seeking to curb the spread of such a plan to other
states. Viteritti fails to accurately explain that the effectiveness of his
proposed school choice plan needs to be judged on a long term basis
by measuring the performance of those students not exposed to
inadequate public schooling.
Aside from the two major defects of Viteritti's argument, he
provides a promising proposal for improving the education of students
from lower socioeconomic backgrounds. By providing the best
education to every student, America can move much closer to real
equality.
203. Id. at 23.
204. Id. at 24.
205. Id.
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